Grimmer, Reinhard / Irmler, Werner / Opitz, Willi / Schwanitz, Wolfgang (Editors):
Die Sicherheit. Zur Abwehrarbeit des MfS, 2 Vol., 1,248 pp., Edition Ost im Verlag Neues Berlin, Berlin 2002 [www.eulenspiegel-verlag.de]
by Bodo Wegmann
In April 2002, an edition was published in Berlin/FRG which is remarkable for the study of intelligence related contemporary history
-because of its authors as well as because of its contents.
1. The group of editors and authors
„Die Sicherheit” was written by a group of 20 officers who had been in high and highest positions in the Ministerium fuer
Staatssicherheit (MfS, Ministry of State Security) of the Deutsche Demokratische Republik (DDR, German Democratic Republic)
Together, they served a total of 729 years in the MfS, most of them with an average period of service of 38 years.
It is the first time in history that such a group of intelligence professionals who had been on active duty until only a little more than a
decade ago has published such a project. Among them are (in alphabetical order and with their former positions):
Karli Coburger (General, ret.: head main-dept. VIII/observation);
Manfred Dietze (General, ret.: head main-dept. I/military counter-espionage);
Siegfried Haehnel (General, ret.: head district office Berlin);
Werner Irmler (General, ret.: head dept. ZAIG/evaluation and information);
Alfred Kleine (General, ret.: head main-dept. XVIII/economical security);
Horst Maennchen (General, ret.: head main-dept. III/signals intelligence);
Guenter Moeller (General, ret.: head main-dept. KS/personnel division);
Gerhard Neiber (General, ret.: DeputySecretary of State Security);
Willi Opitz (General, ret.: head JHP/MfS-academy);
Siegfried Rataizik (Colonel, ret.: headdept. XIV/imprisonment on remand);
Wolfgang Schmidt (Ltnt.-Col., ret.: head information div. of main-dept. XX/internal and state security);
Wolfgang Schwanitz (General, ret.:Deputy Secretary of State Security);
Dieter Skiba (Colonel, ret.: head dept. IX-11/ internal NS-archive);
Wolfgang Stuchly (Ltnt.-Col., ret.: head dept. II-5/counter-espionage investiga-tions).
Looking at the variety of organisational units covered by the group of authors it becomes obvious that the book concentrates on
subjects of internal national security and intelligence. This was what they had intended because there is a multitude of publications
concerning the GDR’s external intelligence service, the Hauptverwaltung A (HV A, main-administration A, foreign espionage)
already available since many years. Therefore „Die Sicherheit” deals with counter-intelligence work and national state-security
duties for which the MfS had been responsible since its constitution on February 8, 1950.
Volume 1 begins with the chapter “The End” (“Das Ende”). It reminds of the political situation of 1989/90. The authors explain the
influence the policy of persistency of the ruling party SED (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, Socialist Unity Party of
Germany) had on the MfS during these decisive months. The SED was unable to deal with the seething situation in her country. For
the MfS the party’s silence, the sudden lack of governance was paralysing: since four decades the MfS had acted strictly by order of
the SED. Now there were no directions anymore while the political and social order changed. But without SED-direction there was
no MfS-action. This, too, had been the maxim of the MfS over forty years.
This supremacy of the SED and its security-policy regarding national, international and military affairs is subject of the second essay. Written by Grimmer, Irmler, Neiber, and Schwanitz here the socialistic understanding of state, society and party-interests becomes evident. Though they were rated as different subjects they were considered to be elements of a homogeneous oneness. Like in all other nations ruled by communist/socialist governments, party interests dominated state-affairs in the GDR, too. Although the authors do not express such views explicitly reading between the lines it becomes obvious that the continuous weakness of such a system was that the ruling party only relied on a multitude but never had any majority.So such governments constantly have to consolidate and secure their power. E. g., the constitution of the GDR cemented the dominating position of the SED within East-Germany’s state, government, and society.
One of the party’s instruments to secure its absolute power was the MfS. This function of the ministry was destined in its statutes of
1953 and 1969. Both are reproduced at the end of this chapter. The authors equate these statutes with regular, legislative laws. But
this is unjustified for both statutes had been classified top secret and before they were published after 1990 they had been known to a
very limited group of officials only. The authors are aware of this fact but apparently neglect it which curtails their essay’s quality.
The value of this chapter is that the security policy of the SED is explained as integrated into the contemporary context of German and
Cold War history. Problems of realizing sovereign policy are presented as well as the consequences resulting from this political
situation for the MfS. Acting on behalf and by order of the leadership of the SED the MfS had to deal with almost everything the
party perceived as potentially hostile or dangerous. To a certain degree such an employment of a state security authority is justified
which the authors substantiate. But they express clear criticism about the SED for making the ministry increasingly responsible for
hand-ling all kinds of political and social problems.
At the end of this comprehensive essay it has become evident that the MfS had not been an imperium arcanum within the GDR but
was an instrument of the SED government acting by order of the party. Its actions had not been without legal positions but were in
accordance with GDR jurisdiction.
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 are about duties and methods employed by the MfS. Grimmer and Irmler explain the variety of hostile
activities the MfS had to deal with. They included all kinds of criminals, foreign intelligence services and organizations whose activities
had been aimed at destabilizing the GDR but also individuals and groups who tried to establish alterations of the SED-policy.
Here, too, the problem is explained that the SED increasingly used its MfS to solve social problems. The more political and social
problems and difficulties appeared the more the SED shifted its responsibility to the MfS until the ministry even had to control the
performance of planned economy targets. Clearly the authors criticize that the MfS was alienated from its actual purposes by the
party (vol. 1, p. 269). In their retrospective view they conclude that “these were unfit attempts to influence or even control social
procee-dings”(vol. 1, p. 266).
But although the MfS had to deal with increasingly more duties it is incorrect to describe East Germany’s state security system as
ubiquitously. A value of this chapter is that Grimmer and Irmler state many facts and figures against this widespread prejudice. Their
arguments will support further serious research.
Among the methods the MfS had applied to investigate potentially hostile activities were its so-called Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter (IM,
Unofficial Employees). These IM were what other intelligence services refer to as sources, informers, assets etc., they were elements
of the MfS’ human intelligence. Comprehensively Anders and Opitz explain the multitude of administrative rules MfS officers had to
apply when recruiting and employing IM. And they describe the various categories of IM which is not new but interesting to everyone
with interest in this subject and because it is important to know such differences for a factual dealing with this subject.
No one would deny any intelligence or security authority to employ HumInt like IM. The decisive question is up to which degree is it
legitimate to apply this instrument. Unfortunately the authors did not touch this subject. On the other hand it is an advantage of their
chapter that they explain the employment of IM among juveniles to counter falsified information spread in various publications. And
they express their regret that case-officers and leading cadres of the MfS had been unable to protect their IM since 1990.
The IM-chapter is followed by an essay by Coburger and Rauscher about covert investigation and observation. Written in a very
factual way they explain the various methods and techniques the main-department VIII and its sub-units had employed; Coburger had
been head of this main-department until 1989.
They inform about the requirements the staff of this unit had to meet and about the variety of duties. Among them were observations
of dead-letter-boxes, transit-routes through GDR-territory, suspects of counter-espionage investigations and the Military Liaison
Missions of the Western allied forces which had been stationed in Potsdam. Allied legal positions allowed them to inspect military
activities in GDR territory. VIII-units were constantly on their track. Main-dept. VIII also carried out secret investigations in the West
but unfortunately the authors refuse to reveal more than that fact itself.
There have been some superficial reports about supposedly ultra-secret MfS-officers. Coburger and Rauscher explain this special
category of officers, referred to as U-Mitarbeiter (U-employees). They were merely used to carry out investigations in environments
where their affiliation with the MfS had to be kept secret in any case.
Opitz introduces the chapters 7 to 17. His report imparts a brief survey about the organisational responsibilities of various
main-departments and departments of the MfS. Some of these units are described in detail in the following chapters beginning with
main-dept. II/counter-espionage.
Between 1954 and 1982 Moeller had served in the MfS’ counter-espionage before his transfer to the personnel division. Stuchly,
too, had spent most of his career in counter-espionage. Their comprehensive and factual report reveals many details of espionage
cases targeted against the GDR. They begin with an informative tour d´horizon of Western intelligence services which were
responsible for most of the espionage activities against East Germany: West Germany’s BND, Verfassungsschutz, the US intelli-gence
community and the services of Great Britain and France. Having introduced these adversaries the authors show methods and
techniques used by the MfS to counter their activities (in co-operation with the Soviet KGB and other partner services).
Having described the organisational history of the units of (main-) dept. II, Moeller and Stuchly explain some techniques employed by
the MfS to investigate espionage cases. The MfS concentrated on prevention and detecting the lines of communications of
foreign agents. The authors’ description of these MfS’ efforts and techniques is remarkable e. g., their explanation of detecting secret
inks, secret copy-paper etc. as well as carefully observing physical movements of suspected agents and couriers.
Though they explain many cases of Western espionage in and against the GDR and reveal some cases of amazing carelessness of
these agencies the authors pay respect to their former opponents in a certain way. They do not name agents and case officers of these
intelligence services and they also do not reveal too many details regarding their offices - though there is no doubt that their
profound knowledge would have allowed them to do so.
The units of main-dept. III were the NSA/CSS of the GDR responsible for signals intelligence as well as communication
security. Main-dept. III had been build up by Horst Maennchen. Therefore, one would expect a lot of his essay - but one should
not. There are only 16 pages of text and this description of the MfS’ SigInt and ComSec capabilities is not appropriate to the
competence of Maennchen and Schwanitz who wrote this chapter.
Their explanation of SigInt is as general as of techniques to locate agents using radio communication. But with interest readers will
note the authors’ statement that the GDR’s official lines of telecommunication “were open like gates of a shed” to Western signals
intelligence gathering (vol. 1, p. 575). And they admit that the MfS had been unable to convince those authorities responsible to
improve this situation. The second valuable information of this chapter are the explanations and illustrations of seismic and magnetic
sensors employed by Western intelligence services to detect movements around military installations in the GDR.
Internal state security is the final chapter of volume one and of quite difficult and controverse contents. In accordance with the
understanding of the political supremacy of the SED stated above the range of political activities considered as potentially dangerous
was wide and affected many citizens. Furthermore even those who considered themselves as loyal to the system could easily become
suspects of illoyality just because they criticized the SED’s political and social system merely with the intention to improve it.
Besides these political opponents and those who assisted Western efforts to destabilize the GDR society the XX was responsible for
he surveillance of religious organizations, the areas of culture, science, and education.
There have been many media reports regarding the MfS’ interest in juveniles. Schmidt spends a lot of attention to this subject and
accounts for these measures in detail. One may not agree with such practices but Schmidt’s explanations truly deserve to be taken
into consideration.
Of course, there have been many Western organizations, groups, and individuals whose efforts had been aimed at stirring up
dissatisfaction among GDR citizens and to destabilize her political system. Many of these are comprehensively described as well as
the necessity for the MfS to counter such activities. Some of these persons and groups did not even hesitate to apply violence as
Schmidt states correctly. But sometimes violence had been part of MfS counter-measures, too. It would have supported the veracity
of Schmidt’s essay if he had not concealed such operations.
With Schmidt again another author states that and how the SED had made use of its authority for state security to solve social
problems, and Schmidt, too, criticizes this fact. It characterizes the deafness of the SED leadership when it constantly ignored
proposals for solutions by the MfS (vol. 1, p. 655).
The chapter on the units of the organisational line XVIII was written by Haehnel und Kleine, the later having served as head of this
main-dept. since1974. The XVIII had been responsible for the protection of the people’s economy. Sabotage and espionage had
to be prevented and investigated. The authors describe many such cases, even more than enough to substantiate the fact that the
GDR’s economy had been a target of foreign espionage agents partially aimed at causing disturbances and damages.
Factually the authors connect the development of this unit with the development of the political and economical situation of East
Germany. Here, too, it becomes obvious that and how the MfS had to serve SED interests. And it becomes evident once again that
the ruling party quite often ignored MfS-reports on economical problems that would have required political solutions instead of state
security service measures. E. g. Haehnel and Kleine state that in the 1980s main-dept. XVIII had prepared “more than 500
information for the leadership of party and state referring to the real situation of the people’s economy” (vol. 2, p. 149). But the SED
did not react and preferred to continue her “problem-ignoring propaganda” (vol. 2, p. 151).
It is unfortunate that the chapter does not contain more information as to dept. 7 of main-dept. XVIII. This unit had been tasked with
HumInt operations in the West thus doing there what other XVIII-units tried to prevent at home. But here, the authors prefer to
remain discreet.
ZKG/BKG were units without equivalent in Western intelligence and security services. Die Zentrale Koordinierungsgruppe (ZKG,
Central Coordination Group) of the ministry and the Bezirkskoordinierungsgruppen (BKG, District Coordination Groups) were
established in 1975, not accidentally the year of the CSCE closing in Helsinki. ZKG/BKG were ordered to coordinate all efforts of
the various MfS-units and -branches to repress the constantly increasing number of applications and legal claims for exit permits as
well as all other legal and illegal attemps to leave the GDR
Niebling, who had served as ZKG-head since 1983, describes the various methods used by East German citizens to leave their
country - either in accordance with GDR law or violating it. He quotes an MfS-report stating that between 1961 and September1989
there had been 556,541 cases of legal applications for permanent exit while there were 94,649 “illegal border crossings” within this
period if time (vol. 2, pp. 206, 207). Unfortunately, it is not said how many attempts of such border crossings had failed and what had
happened to these persons.
Niebling’s essay shows the difference between law and justice. Though he comprehensively explains the legal basis of various
MfS-measures there is no word as to their legitimacy, there is no attempt to find answers as to why so many citizens wanted to leave
the GDR. All the author states to this is that “it is incontestable that [...] the reasons to deny permanent exit permits were relatively
extensive, the reasons for granting such permits were very strict on the other hand” (vol. 2, p. 213).
Once more one realizes that the SED used its secret service to solve social problems in secrecy instead of developing appropriate
political solutions. Niebling clearly states that the SED’s “commanded concealment” and “glossing over” caused increasing discontent
(vol. 2, p. 182). But MfS information to the Politburo and Central Committee did not result in any changes of this policy. It is a
valuable detail of his essay that Niebling explains how this policy was expressed in lacks within jurisdiction. According to Niebling the
main tasks of the MfS and the GDR Home Office (it had also been involved here) had not been to apply restrictive measures but to
induce those who wanted to leave to stay and “to integrate them into the GDR-society again” (vol. 2, p. 217).
The “prevention of terror and other acts of violence. (HA XXII in MfS)” is the headline of the chapter by Neiber and Plomann.
Theybegin with explaining definitions of terrorism and its theoretical background. This is quite valuable especially in times of
considerable public attention in and concern about this phenomenon, and the authors even include the events of Sept. 11, 2001, as
well as the military operations against Afghanistan.
But there is no necessity for that especially because although their essay consists of 103 pages not much is said about the way the
MfS’ main-dept. XXII worked, which methods were employed nor what the MfS had really known about certain terrorist groups
and their activities. It is also unfortunate that is seems as if the MfS or at least these authors did not distinguish between acts of
terrorism and sabotage.
Though MfS counter-terrorism had involved operations abroad the reader only learns that such “operative measures in the
Operationsgebiet [area of operation, MfS-term for the West] were coordinated in compliance with the secrecy” (vol. 2, p.302).
Would you like to be told more about these “operative measures”? Me, too. Instead of writing comprehensively about
West-Germany’s practise of countering terrorism it would have supported the books concern much more if the authors had written
more about the practise of their MfS.
The same with ‘Carlos’: there are only two and a half pages about this famous terrorist group which had stayed in East-Berlin for
some time. The authors reveal nothing not already known from other sources such as the books by Wilhelm Dietl (which they quote)
or David Yallop.
Truly interesting on the other hand is the description of MfS-Operation ‘Bus’. As a consequence of the attempt on the discotheque
‘La Belle’ in West-Berlin in 1986 (the authors say almost nothing about its circumstances or background) dept. XXII arranged
measures to protect busses used by US military personnel: only in 1987 approx. 36,000 civilian and 37,000 military staff of the US
forces used them to visit East-Berlin. There had been information of planned terrorist attacks against these busses and the US
ambassador had asked the GDR government to increase protective measures. MfS-dept. XXII was responsible and its forces
escorted these busses from the moment they entered East-Berlin until they left East-Germany’s capital.
The MfS-equivalent of the KGB’s III rd main-directorate was the main-dept. I (military counter-espionage). Since 1971 Dietze
had served as deputy to main-dept. chief Karl Kleinjung before succeeding him in 1981. He and Riebe factually explain the special
organization of this unit which had been arranged parallel to the structure of the GDR’s armed forces Nationale Volksarmee (NVA,
National People’s Army) and the Grenztruppen (GT, Border Troops).
The first responsibility of main-dept. I was to protect NVA and GT against foreign espionage as well as hostile and dangerous
activities. Though the authors describe a few cases they hold back some of the units remarkable failures such as agent Martha. She
had been the house-keeper of KGB-general Pitovrannev and then of general Karl Linke the first chief of the NVA’s military
intelligence department until 1957. Only a year later the I had not been able to prevent the desertion of Siegfried Dombrowski, a
high-ranking military intelligence officer. And Dietze/ Riebe also don’t mention the operation against the NVA’s MI-head Gregori in
the 1970s/1980s though Dietze had been decisively involved.
The second responsibility of main-dept. I was to conduct reconnaissance operations in the West. Here, the unit concentrated on
military and police activities on West-German territory. This included duties of the Grenzaufklaerung (Border Reconnaissance)
along the GDR’s border to West-Germany up to 50 km deep into the West (since 1982 reduced to 30 km). The authors also reveal
some details regarding main-dept. I’s dept. Aeussere Abwehr (External Counter-service). Dept. AA had several special duties and
forces. They were involved in the death of Michael Gartenschlaeger in 1976 when he had tried to steal a SM-70 mine from the
border fence. Furthermore, AA forces tried to get GDR military officers who had deserted to the West to return.
The MfS had also been tasked with certain criminal investigation duties. This was the field of main-dept. IX and its dept. IX in the
district offices. The essay by Coburger and Skiba explains this field of MfS-activity. It concentrates strongly on laws and legal
positions. Comprehensively they state the multitude of laws, directions, orders etc. which had to be applied when conducting such
investigations. Since to most readers this legal framework is relatively unknown their explanations are rather valuable. But
unfortunately the authors leave it at that and do almost not explain investigative practise. Also, there are no explanations regarding
death penalties and executions (the last had been 1981).
Of much interest is their description of dept. IX/11. This was the MfS’ archive for documents relating to the period of National
socialism. Established in 1967 it consisted of approx. 11 km of written material and had entries to more than 2 million persons.
Skiba was officer of IX/11 and served as its last head. The essay about this unit and its records describes an interesting and
vulnerable chapter of German history, the different attitudes of the East- and the West-German state towards NS-history.
The MfS had maintained jails for prisoners on remand under the control of its dept. XIV. The author of this chapter, Rataizik, had
served in dept. XIV since 1951 and as its head from 1963 to 1990. He spent a lot of efforts to put in order the many irritating and
false information circulating about these prisons for a long time.
Of course, conditions of detention as Rataizik sees it, differ from experiences and recollections of former prisoners. But
factually he describes the organization of custody and explains why there had been devices such as X-ray instruments and refutes
further rumours. It is right that he criticizes memorial and other institutions for the pursue of not objective research. And it is
remarkable that Rataizik refers to criminal investigations and judgements of various courts pronounced since theGerman reunification.
The last unit described is the Juristische Hochschule Potsdam (JHP). It was the academy of the MfS headed by Opitz until 1985.
It is interesting to read how integrated the JHP had been within the educational system of the GDR. Opitz explains the various
ubjects and curricula thought and applied at the JHP. Comprehensively he describes the diversity of chairs which thought general
education subjects as well as historical, political, criminal investigation and legal, and, of course, specific intelligence related subjects
likewise.
Beyond his JHP-explanation Opitz informs about the school of the West-German internal security services. Since not much has been
published about this institution so far his description is a valuable extra.
The final chapter, written by Opitz, too, is a critical essay about the BStU which is the abbreviation for the Bundesbeauftragte
fuer die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik (Federal Commissioner
for the Records of the State Security Service of the former German Democratic Republic). The government office with this impressive
name is the custodian of the MfS’s estate since 1990/91.
Opitz criticizes the way the BStU handles the release of MfS’ material and that the authority does not distinguish the different records
correctly. He further refers to the problem that numbers of entries in MfS card-indexes are presented often as exceptional though they
should berelated to the number of entries of other intelligence and security services.
3. General Remarks
This publication will cause a lot of criticism. Less because of its contents but because of its authors. Especially in Germany there are
still many and influential people who are convinced that what they like to refer to as “former perpetrators” should not be allowed to
obtain such public attention. In accordance with the evaluation of the previous perception of similar publications and public statements
these circles will spend a lot of efforts to discriminate this book.
But “Die Sicherheit” deserves the unbiased attention of all who take a serious and unprejudiced interest in East Germany’s system
and ministry of state security and intelligence as well as of all those who want to get to know as many different approaches and views
as possible.
The book does not contain a vast quantity of facts unknown so far. It is rather the comprehensive presentation of views and facts by
almost twenty high-ranking officers with the intention to document. Certainly, there will be criticism that the authors have documented
and recounted only: they did not achieve to analyse what they have documented so comprehensively. But such remonstrances are
unjustified. Analysing may follow documentation - but this is not imperative. It is absolutely acceptable to deliver a profound
documentation only.
On no account they wanted to deliver a justification or apology in the meaning of mea culpa maxima culpa. But the authors do not
hesitate to criticize: they express self-criticism as well as criticism on their former actions, the lack of appropriate command by the
leadership of the SED and especially the BStU. Their remarks should be taken into consideration further on.
There are some weaknesses which ought to be noted. Many people will find it difficult to accept the very bureaucratic and impersonal
language of almost all essays. This supports the authors’ intention to deliver factual reports but it will disturb many who associate the
subject with personal interests on the other hand.
The essays appear to have been written individually; there is no systematic manner perceptible according to that the essays have been
written. While some authors quote a lot of sources used others don’t. It is valuable that a lot of the material used to support
statements is not of GDR origin. Almost all author used material by West-German, sometimes even US-sources. This way they
prevent arguments to have relied on GDR-literature only.
But the book lacks another systematic manner, too. It seems as if the authors have not sufficiently studied the current state of
historiographical research as to their subjects. For example, there are explanations regarding the case of Noel Field. But among the
sources quoted the profound results of Bernd-Rainer Barth or Wilfriede Otto have not been taken into consideration in a recognizable
way at least. And although results of historian Gerhard Keiderling are quoted he often is stated as “Keiderlin”. The same with
Siegfried Suckut who is quoted as “Suckot”. Unfortunately such negligences in details run through the volumes though they clearly
were avoidable.
The book is arranged in an ingenious order. It begins with introductions to the contemporary context followed by explanations of
general methods applied by various units of the MfS. They are described in the following chapters. But the reader is not informed why
certain units have not been included in the book though one expects their description. Among these units is the main-dept. XIX for
securing all areas of public transport including Deutrans and Interflug (though former head of XIX, Edgar Braun, is among the
authors), the main-dept. for person-protection (the MfS had a quite esteemed bodyguard unit), the bureau for legal affairs, dept. 26
for technical surveillance (the ‘bug boys’ of the MfS) and others.
Almost all essays lack explicit statements of the authors’ understanding of their points of view. They have been in very high positions
for a long time so their world had consisted of instructing and commanding, of general instructions and orders. This precondition has
strongly influenced the points of view of their essays. The basis of their arguments are such general instructions, laws etc. - thus the
way things should have been according to these formal rules. Of course, there have been differences between the way it should
have been and the way it really was. The authors should have stated that they are aware of this fact.
The absolute deficit of “Die Sicherheit” is that it does not contain a profound index. It is a great slovenliness to publish a historical
book of more than twelve-hundred pages and then to leave it up to its reader to find again certain facts, names or places. But this is to
the fault of the authors but the most unfortunate understanding of ‘service’ to the customer of the publishing company.
It is valuable that all essays are endeavoured to brake with the widespread point of view to look at the GDR, its armed forces, and
especially its ministry of state security as a singular phenomenon. They explain the necessity to look at the GDR in the context of
history and especially the Cold War. The historical and political interdependences, reciprocities and mutualities had an immediate
influence and consequences on the development and policy of the MfS. This understanding needs to be accepted.
Further, the MfS is one of the best investigated intelligence and security organizations. But the profound knowledge must not allow the
misleading attitude to estimate the MfS as a singularity. All facts available will remain to be quite one-sided as long as archives of
similar institutions remain closed.
The overall conclusive result of “Die Sicherheit” is that intelligence and security services are appropriate instruments to detect,
observe and investigate political and social dangers and threats.But they are not appropriate instruments to solve such problems.
This was true until 1990 - it still is in 2002.
© Bodo Wegmann, Berlin, May 2002.
The reviewer is an independent political scientist who has published several studies on East-Germany’s intelligence community. He
may be contacted at b.wegmann@web.de.